| The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry | |||
CHAPTER FIFTEEN THE DEPUTY SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER 15.1 Detective Inspector Benjamin Bullock gave evidence to the Inquiry over two days, Day 28 and Day 29. To our observation he was plainly a depressed individual. This is not surprising, since he has been involved in the Stephen Lawrence case since very early on, and has been thus a close observer of the failure of the case. 15.2 When Mr Mellish took over as SIO in 1994 he indicates, in a report on Mr Bullock, that the morale of the officers involved in the investigation was by then extremely low. Again this is not surprising since those who remained on the squad conducting the investigation had plainly failed to gather evidence which might support a prosecution. In 1993 and 1994 the CPS had indicated that the matter should not be taken forward. No further substantial lines of investigation had borne any fruit thereafter. 15.3 There was from the start intense media and indeed political pressure bearing upon the case. Mr Bullock had plainly found what he called the "hype" of the case by the media a burden and indeed an obstruction to the work being done by the squad. Thereafter in 1994 and 1995, the matter was handed over to the private prosecution team. Mr Bullock then saw that prosecution fail. In 1997 he was interviewed over a long period by the officers conducting the PCA inquiry. He is the only serving officer against whom it has been recommended that there should be disciplinary proceedings. Mr Bullock said during his evidence that he is a pessimist. This was apparent from the manner and content of his evidence. No wonder he is generally depressed about the case and its outcome and indeed his part in the matter. 15.4 Mr Bullock has nearly completed his 30 years service with the MPS. He was a Constable from 1969 until 1978 when he was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. He was promoted to the rank of Inspector in 1989. All his service as an Inspector has been as a CID officer. Mr Bullock had never been involved in the investigation of a racist murder before. It was wholly apparent from questions asked by various parties that he was not trained at all in matters of race relations, and he had no training of any kind in racism awareness. All murders must be investigated with skill and energy. But it is apparent, and should be known by all, that the investigation of racially motivated murders has special features of which officers must be aware. Mr Bullock's attitude was that a racist murder was just like any other murder. And he casually and insensitively referred to Stephen Lawrence and Duwayne Brooks as "the two young coloured lads". He was oblivious to his own insensitivity in this regard. 15.5 Quite apart from lack of training in connection with race relations it is also apparent that Mr Bullock had never at any time, until his interviews with the Kent officers, seen the Metropolitan Police manual which sets out the AMIP guidelines in connection with the role which he was to adopt in connection with this investigation. Mr Bullock was the second in command of the AMIP team, both under the supervision of Mr Crampton and Mr Weeden. He was effectively the right hand man and the deputy to those officers. The AMIP manual sets out in detail the "job description" of a Deputy Investigating Officer (DIO). Mr Bullock's answers in connection with questions concerning this manual, both to Kent and ourselves, were most unsatisfactory. He said that the manual was not known to him until the Kent officers drew his attention to it. 15.6 It seems to us astonishing that a man who had been a Detective Inspector since 1989 and who had presumably been a DIO on previous occasions, had never seen the written version of his own job description. There is no need to refer to the details of the document. Paragraph 3.3 requires a DIO to keep himself aware of all policy decisions. He must, according to the document, be able to brief any appropriate person on the complete operation at any time. Furthermore the document decrees that "Once a policy docket is opened ensure that every decision made is recorded with reasons and signed and the policy file is preserved according to the Senior Investigating Officer's instructions". Mr Bullock had no idea that that was part of his duty, indicating that in his view the policy docket was filled out by the SIO and was effectively not his business. 15.7 It is also an unhappy feature of Mr Bullock's evidence that he indicated that ignorance of the AMIP guidelines was not unique. Furthermore, Mr Bullock indicated that he had very little training or knowledge of the HOLMES computer system which was operating in this case. His training had been slight, and he said that the system was, certainly for himself, difficult to operate and indeed something of a mystery. Even now Mr Bullock says that HOLMES is "a very difficult machine to operate and a system to operate". Only since he has been using the HOLMES system in order to research this case has he gained some recent experience. 15.8 Mr Bullock confirmed that in his view the manpower which was available in this AMIP team was inadequate in several ways. He said that there was a shortage of indexers, so that it was not possible to get the material on to the computer with reasonable speed. Furthermore he said that the Office Manager was really doing the majority of the work on his own, so that some of the messages that came in were not seen by himself or the SIO at times when they should have been seen. 15.9 Mr Bullock worked extremely long hours over the early days of this investigation, and his memory of those days is that they were "fighting for information, trying to get on top of what is coming in .....". It is perfectly obvious that the early days of an investigation will be hectic and extremely busy. On the other hand this is no excuse for failure properly to process the vital information that was coming in from the very first day after Stephen Lawrence's murder. 15.10 As to the manning of the team it is sad to have to indicate that Mr Bullock's evidence is in tune with that of other witnesses who asserted that staffing resources were not made available properly to staff the AMIP teams operating in the Metropolitan Police Area at the relevant time. Both Mr Bullock and Mr Crampton indicated that for the Stephen Lawrence murder there was a comparatively generous allowance, but even then the manning levels were inadequate. The conclusion which was put to Mr Bullock was that if this was so then every major investigation team must have been seriously under strength in 1993. To this suggestion Mr Bullock and others agreed. 15.11 Mr Bullock had not worked with Mr Crampton before, although he knew him by name and reputation. Experienced police officers must of course be able to work together whether or not they have previously formed part of a team. 15.12 It is apparent, and was plainly apparent to Kent, that Mr Bullock did not see some of the early information coming into the investigation until too late. The early days are vital, for all the reasons previously set out. Unless the system ensures that the officers at the top receive vital information at once, there is bound to be a problem. Simply for example, Mr Bullock told us that he had never seen the first anonymous message on Friday 23 April, the day when it came in. He saw it later, but plainly as DIO that message ought to have been in front of him forthwith. 15.13 When James Grant came into the police station he was seen by DC Budgen. The DC says that Mr Bullock was told of the arrival of this man, and that Mr Bullock simply said "Go and put it down on a 'green sheet'". There is some difference of opinion between Mr Bullock and DC Budgen as to what actually took place. DC Budgen said that there was a clash of personalities between himself and Mr Bullock in any event. Mr Bullock appears to have told DS Davidson to watch DC Budgen, which supports that belief. Mr Bullock's recollection is that he was shown James Grant's green form statement, and that James Grant had left the police station by that time. However James Grant came back on Saturday 24 April, when he was seen by DS Davidson and DC Budgen. It seems to us that the information given so fully by James Grant ought to have alerted Mr Bullock so that he saw James Grant himself. He never did see James Grant. It would be wrong to say that Mr Bullock took no interest in the information coming in, but it is apparent to us that he himself ought to have followed up such a vital potential witness, whose information raised the suspicion that James Grant himself might have been involved in the murder, or alternatively indicated that he was close to somebody who was involved either in the murder itself or with witnesses who might have given vital information about the murderers. 15.14 Mr Bullock was present at virtually every meeting of the team, and he made notes which were later typed up as an "aide memoire" of what had taken place. We have been using these meeting notes repeatedly during the Inquiry, and they have given a helpful indication of what was and was not said at the meetings. Mr Bullock was at pains to point out that these were really personal notes, and that there was no official status given to them. On the other hand, there is no record otherwise of what took place at the meetings at all, and plainly the notes are important. If these notes had not existed there would be another yawning gap in the documentation in this case. Such notes should have been taken as a matter of formal record of all discussions and decisions. They would then have been available to officers who had been away from the team or who were newly joining in order to bring themselves properly up to date. 15.15 The notes should probably have been included in the HOLMES material, but they were kept separate and they have survived. The original notes have disappeared. Mr Bullock says that the originals are simply mirrored in the typed up notes. There is one important gap in the notes, namely those which might have existed for 3 June 1993. That has some significance, since that is the day when DS Crowley came back to the station with his news that Mr Brooks had expressed his post-identification doubts to DS Crowley. 15.16 There is no need to go over yet again the arrival into the hands of the investigation of the succession of messages from various sources which seemed to "put the finger" on the Acourts, David Norris and Gary Dobson. Mr Bullock was fully aware of the anonymous letters recovered from the telephone kiosk and the Welcome Inn, and he accepted that by the Saturday afternoon or evening the investigating team as a whole was aware of what James Grant had said, and of those letters and the other anonymous information that had been received. This strengthens even more the importance of James Grant and the extent of the failure to deal with him as a matter of priority in order to maximise the profit from his information. His original information was confirmed by other albeit anonymous information. He remained the sole known and named informant. 15.17 Furthermore, the team knew of course by that time that there was evidence available in the shape of the detailed and vivid statement of Mr Brooks, and in Joseph Shepherd's statement. Some time later Mr Westbrook's evidence was available. Over the first weekend, as we have repeatedly seen, there was in the hands of the investigating team abundant information giving them reasonable grounds to suspect that the named suspects were involved in the murder. The Kent "diary" of events which appears in the Appendices to this Report sets out the details. 15.18 Mr Bullock does not remember whether there was any discussion at any team meeting
in connection with the arrests. He said that he accepted that there had been discussions
between himself and Mr Crampton and that the decision made not to arrest was because 15.19 Furthermore, Mr Bullock indicated to the Inquiry that it was his view that as the days went by firsthand evidence might come, perhaps from the DD family or from Emma Cook or from the Witnesses B and K. Mr Bullock's frame of mind was in reality that he "felt there must be somebody out there that saw it". He accepted at once that speed is of the essence in an investigation of this kind, and he like many others plainly regrets in retrospect that an arrest was not made over the first weekend, and certainly by Monday 26 April. Monday is of importance since it seems likely that the Stacey Benefield statement came from DS Davidson to Mr Weeden almost as soon as the changeover of SIO took place. Once the Stacey Benefield statement was available Mr Bullock believes that further delay took place because the team wanted the backup of Matthew Farman's statement, and because Mr Crampton had the idea that the two cases should be run in tandem after that evidence was available. In fact Matthew Farman's statement was taken on 28 April, so that its absence could not possibly have justified further delay after that date. 15.20 Mr Bullock's view of Mr Weeden is that he was considerably more cautious than Mr Crampton. Mr Weeden was, so to speak, inheriting the decision which had already been made in Mr Crampton's time, namely that arrests should be delayed. There is no entry of any kind in the policy file, as we have already pointed out, in connection with the decision not to arrest. It looks very much therefore as if the senior officers were burying their heads in the sand, and simply waiting in the somewhat forlorn hope that an eye witness would turn up. 15.21 The house-to-house inquiries had by Sunday night confirmed the information that the Acourts did live at 102 Bournbrook Road. Furthermore Gary Dobson's address was turned up during the house-to-house inquiries. David Norris' address could have been obtained quickly either from his own collator's card or from that of Clifford Norris, his father 15.22 Mr Bullock tended to say that the decision to arrest was not truly his business. But it appears to us that he was much too ready to go along with the wrong decision made by the SIOs. To his credit he was prepared to accept that if he were to be confronted with the same circumstances again he would accept that the team should have acted more promptly. As we have indicated in connection with the evidence of the SIOs the failure to arrest very early in this affair is the fundamental mistake made. When Mr Weeden took over Mr Bullock says that there was discussion about arrest, but that Mr Weeden "wanted to follow along the same strategy" which had been pursued by Mr Crampton. 15.23 As to Clifford Norris, Mr Bullock indicated that he had had no dealings with this man. He was aware that Mr Norris was wanted for a large drug importation and that he had been involved in a shooting at some stage. Mr Bullock accepts that by the Monday after the murder David Norris' address was known to the team. Apparently nobody knew what Mr Norris looked like right up to the moment of arrest. Given that nobody in the team knew what Mr Norris looked like it was not possible to identify him in the surveillance photographs. On the other hand as soon as he had been arrested it must have been apparent that he appeared in the photographs. Yet as we know no use was made during Mr Dobson's interviews of the photographs of Mr Norris and Mr Dobson seen together outside 102 Bournbrook Road. Thus the valuable ammunition which should have been made available to DS Davidson then, or at a later interview which could easily have been set up, remained unused. 15.24 Our impression of Mr Bullock, both as to the happenings over the first weekend and up to the time of the arrests, is that while he was of course in the ordinary sense of the word busy and involved in what took place, he was often passive. This is highlighted when we consider the steps taken to see the people who might have led the team to some hard evidence. DS Davidson, probably the most experienced Detective Sergeant on the team, was given the task of managing James Grant. He also saw Emma Cook and Michelle Casserley and others, including Witness B somewhat later on. Most of these avenues did not lead to any evidence which could be used in criminal proceedings. As was pointed out to Mr Bullock it may well be that the approach to these people made by the stronger officers was mistaken. Witness B did eventually make a statement, and Witness K made a short statement. But careful consideration of the right approach to these witnesses or informants plainly might have led to much more valuable information or evidence. This is evidenced by the message from DC Keith Hughes and PC Andrews who when carrying out house-to-house inquiries came across the Witness DD and family and put into the HOLMES system the message, "We both feel that a gentle approach when he is seen again would be the appropriate method of extracting information from him. He may also be responsible for the two notes to the Incident Room". Clearly no heed was paid to this information and in any event a gentle approach is something which was undoubtedly not in the armoury of DS Davidson. 15.25 As to surveillance it is apparent that there is considerable criticism to be made of the setting up and carrying on of the activities of the team brought in on Monday, 26 April. We deal with this in detail later (Chapter 18). 15.26 Mr Pitham's report (see para 18.17) plainly sets out the relevant documentation which ought to exist in connection with any formal surveillance operation. Apart from some surveillance logs and an unofficial notebook in which briefing notes were entered by one of the surveillance officers there is no documentation at all in existence. The truth is, as it seems to us, that the officers in charge including Mr Bullock simply drifted into the surveillance operation without much, if any, idea as to what it might achieve. 15.27 As to the two bloodstained tissues found in gardens in Rochester Way, Mr Bullock accepted that it was his decision to include in one of the reports to the CPS the facts in connection with their discovery, together with the conclusion that there would be no evidential value in submitting them for scientific examination since "there is no evidence to suggest any of the suspects had been cut". He wholly agreed that exhibits should not in any circumstances be discarded, and he was not aware that one of the tissues was missing until this was pointed out during his Kent interview. 15.28 As to E-fits or artist's impressions Mr Bullock, in common with Mr Crampton, indicated that the policy was that such things should not be produced before identification parades had taken place. It is obvious that the value of such E-fits or body maps decreases the longer the process is delayed. Furthermore the decision not to ask Mr Westbrook and Mr Shepherd to make an E-fit or an artist's impression does not fit squarely with the decision which was made in connection with Mr Brooks, namely that he should make an E-fit on 5 May and that Mr Shepherd should make one on 6 May. 15.29 The truth is that the earlier these steps are taken the better. Mr Bullock agreed that this was so but apparently doubted whether Mr Westbrook had been available, and he indicated that there was some problem in contacting Duwayne Brooks. The somewhat confused pictured conveyed by the evidence of Mr Bullock in connection with artist's impressions or E-fits confirms our view that the senior officers were in a sense allowing the tide to roll over them and that they were simply not analysing and planning the actions which should be taken properly. 15.30 Good direction and control and properly reasoned decision making is not a feature of the activity of Mr Bullock or of the SIOs in this case. This is perhaps once more highlighted by the evidence of Mr Bullock about the period when Mr Weeden was unavoidably absent from duty for some days after 9 May 1993. Mr Bullock's indication to us, and to the Kent police, is that Mr Ilsley effectively became the SIO. Mr Ilsley says that that role was being performed during those days by Mr Bullock. There can hardly be effective leadership when two senior officers cannot agree on who is in charge. Once again the lack of any record being made of the decision not to arrest after the changeover from Mr Crampton to Mr Weeden is of significance. Mr Bullock says that the question of arrest was being regularly reviewed, but there is no note in any policy file or in any document that this was so. 15.31 As to the Norris connection, it is apparent that Mr Bullock was aware early on of the influence of Clifford Norris, since he told us that "there were some people going round warning off people in general on the estate". He believes that these people were connected to Clifford Norris, but of course he had no direct evidence of that. The suggestion made to Mr Bullock is that David Norris was favoured, or that the officers held off in their investigation of this case because of the existence of Clifford Norris, either through fear or for more sinister reasons. Nobody at this stage seems to have concentrated upon the obvious need to remove Clifford Norris from the scene, and to follow up those who appeared to be having such an important inhibiting effect upon potential witnesses. 15.32 It is however of marked significance, as was pointed out by Mr Gompertz, that Mr Bullock was personally instrumental in resisting an application for bail for David Norris, and in taking positive steps to see that David Norris was prosecuted. 15.33 In connection with the aborted Stacey Benefield case a report was made by Mr Bullock himself to the CPS urging that an application should be made for a re-trial when it emerged that there had been problems in connection with the jury, following the attempted buying off of Stacey Benefield himself. 15.34 In connection with the Witham stabbing, said to have been perpetrated by David Norris and Neil Acourt, Mr Bullock also himself wrote a full report urging that the prosecution of the two men for that offence should be reinstated. A decision had been made earlier by the CPS that the prosecution should be abandoned, but Mr Bullock saw that case as a parallel to the Stephen Lawrence case and urged the CPS to reinstate the prosecution. 15.35 None of his actions in connection with David Norris appear to us to support any allegation that Mr Bullock was favouring that man. Indeed, our conclusion is that Mr Bullock's failings were not motivated by any fear of Clifford Norris or by any intention to hold off the prosecution of these suspects. They stem from inadequacy or inability to make the proper decision at the right time, as a result of Mr Bullock's make up and nature. He does appear to be limited in his ability to make decisions and to act positively in the way in which a good DIO must act, but there is no evidence at all that he was a dishonest man. 15.36 Mr Bullock was cross-examined at length by Mr Mansfield and others. Mr Mansfield extracted from Mr Bullock a series of concessions as to the inadequacy of the work done by Mr Bullock in this investigation. He accepted that looking back he realised that the strategy followed by himself and the SIOs did not work. Earlier he said that he felt that he should have "deployed somebody with the surveillance team". He says that he should have asked for assistance from the Witness Protection Scheme at Scotland Yard in order to deal with young witnesses who were obviously frightened and who did not want to get involved. Furthermore he accepted that during the whole course of his time with the investigation team he never met Mr & Mrs Lawrence. 15.37 Mr Bullock accepted without reservation that this was a racist crime, but as Mr Mansfield pointed out he simply did not appreciate that when such a crime is committed liaison with the family may have its own features, and that it is vital to monitor what is taking place in that regard. Mr Bullock's attitude was that since liaison officers had been appointed it did not in truth occur to him that he should himself go to see Mr & Mrs Lawrence. He regrets now that he did not do so during the whole course of his contact with this case. 15.38 The truth is that Mr Bullock hardly seemed aware that there are particular sensitivities and issues which need to be addressed in connection with racist crimes. One of the vital matters is support for victims and of course for a victim's family. It simply did not occur to Mr Bullock that he might seek to overcome the obvious difficulties in relation to family liaison by influencing the SIO to visit the family or to seek, through the SIO, to visit the family himself in order to address the problems which were evident. He simply did not see it as his task to address such issues no matter how self evident they were. 15.39 Mr Mansfield also pointed out to Mr Bullock that junior officers appeared to be taking the view that this was not simply and solely a racist attack. Whether Mr Bullock can be held to be responsible for the views of the junior officers seems to us to be doubtful. It is however a feature of the case that the senior officers, including Mr Bullock, accept without reservation that this was purely a racially motivated attack, while the more junior ranks expressed their doubts in the wholly unsatisfactory manner which this Inquiry has observed. 15:40 Mr Mansfield roundly attacked the decisions made by Mr Bullock, together with the SIOs, both on the grounds that they were ineffectual and pointless, and also on the grounds that they were motivated in particular because of the influence of Clifford Norris upon the case. We understand and to a considerable extent accept the criticism of Mr Bullock's decision making, of his failure to follow up himself the James Grant information, the failure and non-documentation of the surveillance operation, and the general "laissez faire" approach to the case, in particular of course the decision not to arrest. We do not conclude that there was any kind of sinister motive in Mr Bullock's action or inaction. He was plainly put off by the great degree of media and public attention to the case in the early days, and his training and his general ability were unsuited to a case of this nature. 15.41 As to the surveillance operation we do not accept the suggestion made by Mr Mansfield to Mr Bullock that the surveillance was simply a sham, and part of a conspiracy to go easy on the investigation of these suspects. Such a conspiracy would entail the complicity and co-operation of a large number of officers. Mr Bullock of all people has, as we have indicated, shown that he had no inclination to favour the suspect David Norris. 15.42 We have already indicated that there are no notes of any team meeting on 3 June 1993. That was of course the day upon which Mr Brooks identified Luke Knight, and later, according to DS Crowley, registered his reservations about his own identification. Mr Bullock remembers no telephone calls coming to the investigation offices during that afternoon, but he does remember DS Crowley coming into the Incident Room and speaking to Mr Weeden. He could not remember the words used by DS Crowley, but believes that it was "something to do with the identification and the fact that Brooks wasn't sure or something like that who he identified". The absence of any note of the meeting on that day may be accounted for, said Mr Bullock, by the fact that there was no formal meeting. He pointed out that in any event the fact was that DS Crowley made his statement on 3 June 1993. 15.43 The long and short of it is that Mr Mansfield's cross-examination of Mr Bullock reinforced our view of him formed after Mr Lawson had concluded his questioning. We see no evidence that Mr Bullock was involved in any corrupt conspiracy. He does not seem to us in any way to be the sort of man who might be recruited for devious activity. 15.44 As to Mr Bullock's scepticism about the HOLMES system Mr Gompertz indicated that training in the use of this system is now considerably more advanced. 15.45 The somewhat swingeing conclusions of Mr Mellish as to Mr Bullock were referred to more than once during his questioning. Mr Mellish's criticism of the qualities of leadership of Mr Bullock and of his failure to produce "innovative or positive strategy" have to be echoed by this Inquiry. On the other hand it has to be noted that Mr Mellish added that in other areas of performance, such as policy docket detail and systems management and the major incident procedure, he found Mr Bullock to be thorough, and his attention to detail a vital asset and ingredient for such a high profile case. In a sense that confirms our conclusion that probably this officer, who is an honest man and a very long serving policeman, was appointed to act above his true station and in a position beyond his abilities. Criticism of him has to be considered in the light of that conclusion. 15.46 The major responsibility for the team's failures lies with those who allowed Mr Bullock to occupy a position which was beyond his abilities, and who failed to supervise him. Mr Bullock is the only officer "available" for disciplinary proceedings arising from the PCA investigation. His seniors had by the time of the PCA investigation all retired.
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